Considerable recent research in neurosciences has dealt with the topic of consciousness, even though there is still disagreement about how to identify and classify conscious states. Recent behavioral work on the topic also exists. We survey recent behavioral and neuroscientific literature with the aims of commenting on strengths and weaknesses of the literature and mapping new directions and recommendations for experimental psychologists. We reconcile this literature with a view of human information processing (Cowan, 1988; Cowan et al., 2024) in which (...) a capacity-limited focus of attention is embedded within the activated portion of long-term memory, with dual bottom-up and top-down control of the focus of attention. None of the many extant theories fully captures what we propose as the organization of conscious thought at cognitive and neural levels. It seems clear that information from various cognitive functions, based on signals from various brain areas, is integrated into a conscious whole. In our new proposal, the integration involves funneling information to a hub or focus of attention neurally centered in the parietal lobes and functionally connected to areas representing the currently attended information. This funneling process (bringing information from diverse sensory and frontal sources to contact a small parietal area where attended information is coordinated and combined) may be the converse of global broadcasting, from other proposals (Baars et al., 2021; Baars & Franklin, 2003; Dehaene & Changeux, 2011). The proposed system incorporates many principles from previous research and theorization and strives toward a resolution of the relation between consciousness and attention. Keywords: consciousness, attention, embedded processes model, experimental psychology, neuroscience. (shrink)

Fitting Attitudes accounts of value analogize or equate being good with being desirable, on the premise that ‘desirable’ means not, ‘able to be desired’, as Mill has been accused of mistakenly assuming, but ‘ought to be desired’, or something similar. The appeal of this idea is visible in the critical reaction to Mill, which generally goes along with his equation of ‘good’ with ‘desirable’ and only balks at the second step, and it crosses broad boundaries in terms of philosophers’ other (...) commitments. For example, Fitting Attitudes accounts play a central role both in T.M. Scanlon’s [1998] case against teleology, and in Michael Smith [2003], [unpublished] and Doug Portmore’s [2007] cases for it. And of course they have a long and distinguished history. (shrink)

Lara Buchak argues for a version of rank-weighted utilitarianism that assigns greater weight to the interests of the worse off. She argues that our distributive principles should be derived from the preferences of rational individuals behind a veil of ignorance, who ought to be risk averse. I argue that Buchak’s appeal to the veil of ignorance leads to a particular way of extending rank-weighted utilitarianism to the evaluation of uncertain prospects. This method recommends choices that violate the unanimous preferences (...) of rational individuals and choices that guarantee worse distributions. These results, I suggest, undermine Buchak’s argument for rank-weighted utilitarianism. (shrink)

Batı’da teorik felsefe; Analitik Felsefe (AF), Kıta Felsefesi (KF) ve Felsefe Tarihi (FT) olmak üzere üçe ayrılır. Fakat üçünde de işler yolunda değildir. AF, felsefenin bir bilim olabileceği iddiasından kuşku duyduğu için gerçek dünyayla ilgilenmiyorken başından beri uygun bir teorik yöntem izlemeyen Kıta Felsefesinin uygulanışı, belirli politik ve etik yargılara hizmet edecek şekilde özelleştirilmiştir. FT çalışmalarının gidişatı ise eldeki eserin nesnel değerinden daha çok ilgili filozofun ait olduğu ulus veya kültüre göre bölgesel bir temelde gelişmiştir. Felsefede ilerleme sağlanacaksa bu ancak (...) bahsi geçen tuzaklardan kaçınılarak gerçekleşebilir. (shrink)

Tarihte herhalde çok az soru Tanrı’nın varlığı sorusu kadar sık sorulmuş, çok yanıtlanmış ve verilen birbirinden farklı onca yanıta rağmen kesin bir sonuca ulaştırılamayıp tartışılmaya devam etmiştir. Yine de geçmişe dönüp baktığımızda bu soruya verilen farklı yanıtların farklı uygarlıkların inşa edilmesine, bazılarının yıkılmasına, acımasız çatışmalara ve her şeye rağmen kucaklaşmalara da vesile olduğunu görüyoruz. Tanrı var mı? Varsa onu nasıl bilebiliriz? Tanrı yoksa her şey mubah mı? İnsan aklı ilahi olanı kavrayabilir mi? Tanrı’nın varlığı ahlaklı olmanın şartı mı? Evren akıllı (...) bir tasarımcının imzasını taşıyor mu? Bu kitapta felsefeci William David Beck, bu sorulara tarihte verilen yanıtları ve bu konudaki tartışmaları ele alarak meselenin genel ve tarihsel bir tablosunu bize sunuyor. Platon, Aristoteles, Marcus Aurelius gibi Eski Yunan ve Roma düşünürlerinden Anselmus, Thomas Aquinas, Augustinus ve Yahudi-Hıristiyan geleneğine, Doğu’nun bilgelerine, İbni Rüşd, Fârâbî ve Gazzâlî gibi İslam düşünürlerinden Alvin Plantinga, Graham Oppy, Sam Harris, Richard Dawkins, Max Tegmark gibi Batılı modern ilahiyatçılara, bilim insanlarına ve Yeni Ateizm hareketine kadar uzanan bir çizgide “Tanrı var mı?” sorusuna verilen çeşitli yanıtları ve bu yanıtlara sunulan akılcı gerekçeleri ortaya koyarak soruya felsefece bir yanıt vermenin nasıl bir iş olduğunu da gösteriyor. (shrink)

Bilim ve çarpık bilim arasına sınır çizebilmek için yapılan girişimler farklı teorilerin gelistirilmesini sağlamıştır. Henüz net bir sınır çizilememiştir ve tartışmalar devam etmektedir. İlk olarak doğrulama ve yanlışlama teorileri daha sonraları ise bilim çalışmalarını bir bütün olarak ele alan, araştırma programları olarak gören teoriler sunulmuştur. Bilimsel çalışmaların, yeni sorunlar üretmesi ve eleştirel bakış açısına sahip olması da bilim olanın sınırlarını çizebilmek için ölçütler arasında sayılmıştır. Bu çabalar ile bilim pratiklerinin irdelenmesi zamanla bilim insanına ve bilim kurumlarına yönelmiştir. Bu konunun önemli (...) bir sorunu bilim yolu ile ulaşabileceğimiz doğru bilginin ne olduğu ile neyin bilim olarak ele alınabileceğinin tek bir sorun gibi ele alınmasıdır. Bilimsel doğrunun ne olduğu ile bilimsel bilginin ne olduğu tartışması iç içe yürütülmektedir. Bir diğer sorun ise bilimin sınırlarını belirlerken bilim çalışmaları dışında etik ve sosyal ölçütler aranmasıdır. Bu yaklaşımlar konuyu çözümsüz bir noktaya götürmektedir. Diğer önemli nokta Astroloji örneğinin yanlış bilgilerle ele alınmasıdır. Bu çalışmada tartışmanın bilim pratiklerinde kalması gerektiği savunulmuştur. Çarpık bilimi ayırmak için sık kullanılan Astroloji örneği yeniden ele alınarak yanlış yargılara sebep olan bilgiler düzeltilmeye çalışılmıştır. Ayrıca önermelerin bilimsel doğruyu ayırma konusundaki önemi ve durumu tartışılmış böylece neyin bilim, neyin bilimsel doğru ve neyin bilim dışı olduğu netleştirilmeye çalışılmıştır. (shrink)

Özet: Bu yazıda nefret sözcüklerinin dilsel işlevi açıklanmaya çalışılacaktır. Bunun için öncelikle nefret sözcüklerinin kimi özelliklerini tartışıp sonrasında bu özelliklerin tümünün önereceğim sözcük sezdirimine dayalı nefret sözcükleri kuramı ile başarıyla açıklanabileceğini savunacağım. Buna göre nefret sözcükleri sözcük anlamı olarak bir insan grubuna işaret ederken, tipik kullanımlarında kimi olumsuz nitelikleri sözcük düzeyinde sezdirirler. Sözcük sezdirimi kavramı Grice'ın sezdirim kavramının bir tümcecikten daha küçük dilsel yapılara uyarlanmasıyla ortaya çıkar. Bu uyarlamanın olanaklı olduğunun gösterilmesi için Grice’ın tümce düzeyi için tasarladığı ilke ve maksimlerin (...) tümce altı düzeyde nasıl işlediğini açıklayacağım. Abstract: This paper aims at explaining the linguistic function of slurs. To this aim, I will first discuss certain features of slurs and then argue that these features can be successfully explained in my suggested phrasal implicature theory of slurs. In this view, slurs denote a group of people, and in their typical use they imply certain negative features at the phrasal level. Phrasal implicature is a notion which is developed by adapting Gricean notion of implicature to the linguistic units that are smaller than a clause. In order to show that this adaptation is possible, I will demonstrate how the Gricean principles and maxims work at the subsentential level. (shrink)

Kant’ın (ö.1804) felsefesi eklektik bir felsefedir ve Aydınlanma felsefesinin devamı niteliğindedir. Aydınlanma felsefesine benzer şekilde felsefesinin temeli akıldır ve aklın sınırları ve kullanımı hakkında fikirler ileri sürmüştür. Kant, dini ele alırken Tanrı’nın varlığının saf akılla ispatlanamayacağı sonucuna varmıştır. Çünkü akılla yapılan ispatlarda Tanrı’nın varlığına getirilen deliller kadar yokluğuna da eşit derecede deliller getirilebilir. O nedenle Tanrı’nın varlığının ispatında saf aklın değil pratik aklın önemli olduğunu ve ahlâksal yasaların bizi Tanrı’nın varlığına götüreceğini ileri sürer. Bu görüşünü desteklemek için eserlerinde teistik delillerin (...) akla uygun olmadığını ve akılla bilinemeyeceğini ispatlamaya çalışmıştır. Ona göre ontolojik, kozmolojik, teleolojik.. vb. teistik delillerin işlevi zihni tanrıbilim için hazırlamaktan ibarettir. Fakat tek başına Tanrı’nın varlığını ispat etmekten uzaktır. Ontolojik delili Tanrı’nın varlığının ispatı ile ilgili belli bir felsefi delilin adı olarak kullanan ilk kişi 18.yy. filozoflarından Christian Wolff’tur (ö.1754). Ontolojik delil, diğer deliler gibi ‘olgulara dayalı’ değildir. Bu delil tamamen kavramsal ve a priori önermelere dayanır. Delil, Tanrı’nın doğrudan doğruya ve hiçbir vasıtaya gerek kalmadan bilineceği üzerine kurgulanmıştır. Tanrı’nın mükemmelliği, ‘Tanrı vardır’ önermesinin sadece düşünsel bir önerme mi yoksa dış varlığa karşılık gelen bir önerme mi olduğu, Tanrı’nın varlığının zorunluluğu meselesi ontolojik delil içinde tartışılan konulardır. Ontolojik delilde ‘Tanrı vardır’ önermesi a priori ve analitik bir önerme olarak kabul edilmektedir. Analitik önermeler ise Tanrı’nın varlığının zorunluluğunu gösterir. Kant’ın eleştirisine göre a priori kavramlar yoluyla her şeyi olanaklı düşünebiliriz ve bunun için zihnimizde herhangi bir sınırlama olamaz. Tanrı ve zorunlu varlık kavramlarını zihnimizde düşündüğümüz gibi Anka Kuşu, Kaf dağı, Pamuk Prenses..vb. kavramların da var olduğu düşünülebilir ve bizim düşünmemiz bunları zorunlu yapmaz, tıpkı Tanrı’yı düşündüğümüzde Tanrı’yı zorunlu var kılmadığı gibi. Bu bildiride Kant’ın düşüncesi ortaya konulduktan sonra onun düşüncesindeki tutarlılık ve tutarsızlıklara değinilecektir. Anka Kuşu, Kaf Dağı, Pamuk Prenses ..vb. gibi hayali kavramlarla Tanrı kıyaslanabilir mi? Biz hayali varlıkları zihnimizde oluştururken yine duyu verilerinden yararlanır ve dış dünyada gözlemlediğimiz canlılara benzer ‘hayali varlıklar’ üretiriz. Dış dünyada, kuş, dağ ve prenses vardır. Bizim tek yaptığımız bunu hayali adlar takmaktır. Fakat Tanrı söz konusu olduğunda dış dünyada gözlem yaparak bir Tanrı’ya şahit olmayız ve bu şahit olduğumuz Tanrı’ya benzer bir Tanrı’yı hayal ederek zihnimizde hayali bir varlık oluşturmayız. Tam tersine Tanrı kavramını zihnimizde oluştururken hiçbir şeye benzemeyen, sebebi olmayan, her şeyi varlığa getiren, mükemmel bir varlık çıkarımını akıl ve mantığımızın bizi götürdüğü sonuçla ortaya koyarız. Çünkü insan olarak biz birbirimize benzeriz, bizim bir sebebimiz vardır, hiçbir şey yaratamayız ve mükemmel değilizdir. Ve evrenin sonsuzluğu, yıldızlar, gezegenler, insanın biyolojik yapısı, matematiksel düzen bizi zorunlu olarak ‘sebebi olmayan mükemmel bir sebep’ aramaya iter. Ve Ontolojik Delil ortaya çıkar. Bu bakımdan Kant’ın eleştirisini kabul etmek mümkün değildir. (shrink)

İngiltere, Avrupa’da en fazla Müslüman nüfusa sahip ülkelerden biridir ve ülkede Müslümanlara yönelik olumsuz tutumlar giderek artmaktadır. Yabancılara yönelik bu olumsuz tutumların birçok farklı psikolojik nedeni bulunmaktadır. Dehşet Yönetimi Kuramı kapsamında yapılan çeşitli araştırmalar, bu nedenlerden birisinin bireylere ölümün hatırlatılması olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Bu kurama göre, hayatta kalmak gibi güçlü bir motivasyona sahip olan insan aynı zamanda bu çabalarının bir gün başarısız olacağını bilir ve ölüm kaygısı yaşar. Ölümün hatırlatıldığı bireyler, ölüm kaygısının üstesinden gelmek için kendi kültürlerine yöneldiklerinde, diğer kültürlere (...) yani dış gruplara veya onların üyelerine karşı önyargı geliştirirler veya onlara karşı olumsuz tutumlar edinirler. Bu iddianın test edilmesi için 2018 yılı içerisinde İngiltere’de 50 kişinin katılımıyla bir deney gerçekleştirilmiştir. Deney grubuna ölümü hatırlatıcı video izlettirilmiş; daha sonra deney ve kontrol gruplarına Müslümanlara yönelik tutumları ölçen sorular yöneltilmiştir. Elde edilen veriler analiz edildiğinde, ölümün hatırlatıldığı bireylerin (deney grubu), Müslümanlara yönelik tutumlarının, diğer bireylerden (kontrol grubu) daha olumsuz olduğu tespit edilmiştir. (shrink)

After the death of Mevlana Celaleddin-i Rumi (d.1273), the cult of Mevlevi continued its structuring. Rumi's son Sultan Veled (d.1312) and his grandson Ulu Arif Çelebi (d.1320) contributed greatly to this structuring. Sultan Veled tried to turn the lodge he took over from his father into a systematic sect around Rumi's mystical thought and Mevlevi disciples. Ulu Arif Çelebi, on the other hand, is a very effective name in organizing Mevleviism as a cult. With his systematic studies and travels, he (...) made Mevlevi's spread in lodges and madrasahs, and he made efforts to teach Masnavi, the work of his grandfather Mevlana Celaleddin Rumi, in madrasahs. In addition, Ulu Arif Çelebi asked Ahmet Eflakî to write a book called Ariflerin Menkıbeleri about Rumi’s life, in order to keep his grandfather's memory alive. The entry of Mevlevi into the Ottoman State was through marriage. Mutahhare Hatun, daughter of Sultan Veled, was married to Süleyman Şah, the Germiyanoğulları leader. Süleyman Şah married the daughter of this marriage, Devlet Hatun, to Yıldırım Beyazıt, and left as a dowry Kütahya, Tavsanlı, Simav and Eğrigöz to Ottoman Empire. Yıldırım Bayezıd was appointed as the governor of Kütahya. Mehmet Çelebi was born from this marriage. The title of Çelebi is a title given to the descendants of Rumi, and Mehmet Çelebi, one of the sultans of the Fetret Period (A period of great depression), was one of the grandchildren of Rumi. The children of Mehmet Çelebi are remembered with the title of 'Çelebi'. Through this marriage, Mevlevi began to spread to the Ottoman Empire. Thus, Mevleviism would prevail in the Ottoman Empire, where Ahilik organization and Ahi culture prevailed, and Mevlevihane and Asitane would be established in many parts of the country with the support of the Ottoman State. Mevlana Celaleddin-i Rumi’nin (ö.1273) ölümünden sonra Mevlevilik bir tarikat olarak yapılanmasını sürdürmüştür. Mevlana’nın oğlu Sultan Veled’in (ö.1312) ve torunu Ulu Arif Çelebi’nin (ö.1320) bu yapılanmada katkısı oldukça büyüktür. Sultan Veled babasından devraldığı dergâhı, Mevlana’nın mistik düşüncesi çerçevesinde ve Mevlevi müritler etrafında sistemli bir tarikat haline getirmeye çalışmıştır. Ulu Arif Çelebi ise Mevleviliği bir tarikat olarak örgütlemede oldukça etkili bir isimdir. O sistematik olarak yaptığı çalışmalar ve seyahatlerle Mevleviliğin tekke, zaviye ve medreselerde yayılmasını sağladığı gibi dedesi Mevlana Celaleddin ’in eseri Mesnevi’nin medreselerde okutulması için de çaba sarf etmiştir. Ayrıca Ulu Arif Çelebi, dedesinin hatırasını canlı tutabilmek Ahmet Eflaki adındaki bir yazıcıya Mevlana’nın hayatını yazdırmıştır. (Ariflerin Menkıbeleri kitabı) Mevleviliğin Osmanlı Devleti’ne girişi evlilik yoluyla olmuştur. Sultan Veled’in kızı Mutahhare Hatun, Germiyanoğulları Beyi Süleyman Şah ile evlidir. Süleyman Şah bu evlilikten olan kızı Devlet Hatun’u Osmanlı Devleti’nin o dönem şehzadesi olan Yıldırım Beyazıt ile evlendirmiş ve çeyiz olarak Kütahya, Tavşanlı, Simav ve Eğrigöz dolaylarını Osmanlılara bırakmıştır. Yıldırım Bayezıd ise Kütahya valiliğine getirilmiştir. Bu evlilikten Mehmet Çelebi dünyaya gelmiştir. Çelebi unvanı Mevlana’nın soyundan gelenlere verilen bir unvandır ve Fetret Dönemi padişahlarından olan Mehmet Çelebi, Mevlana’nın torunlarındandır. Mehmet Çelebi’nin çocukları ‘çelebi’ unvanıyla anılmaktadır. Bu evlilik yoluyla Mevlevilik Osmanlı’da yayılmaya başlamıştır. Böylece daha önce Ahilik teşkilatı ve Ahi kültürünün hâkim olduğu Osmanlı Devleti’ne Mevlevilik hâkim olacak ve Osmanlı Devleti’nin desteğiyle ülkenin birçok yerinde Mevlevihane ve Asitane kurulacaktır. (shrink)

Turkish Bu makalede bireylerin eylemlerine müdahale etmenin tek haklı gerekçesinin başkalarına zarar gelmesini önlemek olduğunu ifade eden ‘‘zarar ilkesine (Zİ)’’ getirilen üç eleştiriyi tartıştım. Öncelikle ilkeyi anlamlı kılabilecek bir zarar tarifinin bulunmadığı eleştirisini ele alarak bu eleştirinin, ilkenin ancak problemsiz bir zarar tanımı ile birlikte makul kabul edilebileceği varsayımına dayandığını tespit ettim. Zarar kavramına ilişkin var olan bilgi dağarcığımızı görmezden gelmesi ve zarara başvuran ilkeler haricindeki diğer birçok ilkeyi de kapsayan genel bir şüpheciliğin önünü açması nedeniyle ilgili varsayımı reddetmemiz gerektiğini (...) savundum. İkinci olarak, zarar vermenin yanlışlığının halihazırda yaygın olarak kabul ediliyor olmasından ötürü Zİ’nin bize yeni bir şey söylemediği, zararın türü/miktarı gibi güncel tartışmaların yoğunlaştığı noktalarda suskun kaldığı ve dolayısıyla artık işlevsiz olduğu eleştirisini değerlendirdim. Buna karşın hangi zarar tarifinin benimsendiğinden bağımsız olarak Zİ’nin, zararın varlığı kanıtlanmadıkça bireylerin eylemlerinde serbest bırakılmaları gerektiğini vurgulayan bir özgürlük karinesini temsil etme ve bazı eylemlerin zarar içermese dahi yasaklanabileceğini düşünen hukuki ahlakçılara yasak taleplerini gerekçelendirme yükümlülüklerini hatırlatma şeklinde iki önemli işleve halen sahip olduğunu iddia ettim. Son olarak Zİ'nin potansiyel kötüye kullanımlarına dair endişelere değindim. Bu endişelerin giderilmesi için yapılması gerekenin, zarar içeren eylemleri belirlemeye çalışmak değil, her eylemin bir miktar zarar içerme olasılığına sahip olduğunu kabul ederek hangi tür zararların hukuken düzenlenmesi gerektiği özelinde makul bir seçenek ortaya koymak olduğunu iddia ettim. Zİ’nin suiistimallerinin genellikle zarar kavramının geniş yorumlanmasının ürünü olduğunu düşünerek, cebir ve hile eylemlerinin neden olduğu birinci derece zararları esas alan, hukuki öngörülebilirliği artıracak bir hukuki çerçeve benimsemeyi tercih ettim. Kuşkusuz bu tercih yasaklanması gereken bazı zararlı eylemlere karşı hukuki koruma sağlayamama riskini içermektedir; ancak bu, özgürlüğü korumayı taahhüt eden genel bir ilke ortaya koymak için ödenmesi gereken bir bedeldir. Buradan hareketle, ele aldığım üç eleştiriden hiçbirinin Zİ’nin reddedilmesini gerektirmediği sonucuna vardım. English In this article, I discuss three criticisms of ‘‘the harm principle (HP)’’, which states that the only justification for interfering with individual’s actions is to prevent harm to others. First, I address the criticism that there is no definition of harm that can make the principle reasonable, and I find that this criticism is based on the assumption that the principle can only be considered reasonable with an unproblematic definition of harm. I argue that we should reject this assumption because it ignores our existing knowledge of the concept of harm and opens the way for a general skepticism that extends to many principles other than those addressing harm. Secondly, I consider the criticism that, since the wrongfulness of causing harm is already widely accepted, the principle tells us nothing new, is silent on the points where current debates intensify, such as the type/amount of harm, and is therefore no longer functional. On the other hand, I argue that, regardless of the definition of harm adopted, the HP still serves two important functions: Representing a presumption of liberty that emphasizes that individuals should be free to act unless the existence of harm is proven, and reminding legal moralists who believe that some acts can be prohibited even if they do not involve harm of their obligation to justify such prohibitions. Finally, I address concerns about potential abuses of the HP. I argue that what is needed to address these concerns is not to try to identify acts that involve harm, but to recognize that every act has the potential to involve some level of harm, and to make a reasonable choice as to which types of harm should be regulated by law. Considering that abuse of HP often arises from a broad interpretation of the concept of harm, I prefer to adopt a legal framework that would increase legal predictability, based on the first-degree harms caused by acts of force and fraud. Undoubtedly, this choice entails the risk of failing to provide legal protection against certain harmful acts that should be prohibited, but this is a price that must be paid for a general principle that is committed to protecting liberty. Thus, I conclude that none of the three criticisms I discussed require the rejection of HP. (shrink)

Turkish Bu makalede son yıllarda deontolojik ve sonuçsalcı liberteryen yaklaşımlara destek ve alternatif olarak ortaya çıkan, liberteryen temaların yaygın olarak paylaşılan moral yargılara dayandırılmasını öngören sağduyusal etik sezgiler temelli liberteryenizm, politik otorite şüpheciliği, özel mülkiyet ve serbest piyasa başlıkları üzerinden tanıtılarak desteklenmektedir. Çalışmanın ilk bölümü, birtakım moral gerçeklere sezgisel olarak ulaşmanın olanağını ifade eden sezgici etik zeminin açıklanmasına ayrılmıştır. Ardından, bireyler ve devletin aynı moral standartları işaret eden etik sezgilere tabi olduğu fikrinden yola çıkılarak, devletin zorlayıcı doğası ile karakterize olan (...) eylemlerinin sağduyusal etik sezgilerle yaşadığı karşıtlığa işaret edilmiştir. Dolayısıyla bu bölüm aynı zamanda, devletin moral normlara karşı bağışık olduğu fikrinin dayandığı en popüler çağdaş yaklaşım olan sosyal sözleşme teorisinin problemlerini de sunmaktadır. Son olarak yaygın olarak paylaşılan etik sezgilerin, özel mülkiyet ve serbest piyasa uygulamalarını destekleyici niteliği ortaya konmuştur. English In this article, I introduce and defend libertarianism based on common- sense ethical intuitions that has emerged in recent years as a support and alternative to deontological and consequentialist libertarian approaches, and which proposes that libertarian themes be grounded in widely shared moral judgments. I devote the first part of the work to the explanation of the intuitive ethical ground, which expresses the possibility of intuitively reaching some moral facts. Then, starting from the idea that individuals and the state are subject to ethical intuitions that point to the same moral standards, I draw attention to the contrast between common-sense ethical intuitions for the actions of the state, which are characterized by the its coercive nature. In this chapter, I also discuss the problems of social contract theory, the most popular contemporary approach on which the idea that the state is immune to moral norms is based. Finally, I argue that widely-shared ethical intuitions support private property and free market practices. (shrink)

Faith is a central attitude in Christian religious practice. The problem of faith and reason is the problem of reconciling religious faith with the standards for our belief-forming practices in general (‘ordinary epistemic standards’). In order to see whether and when faith can be reconciled with ordinary epistemic standards, we first need to know what faith is. This chapter examines and catalogues views of propositional faith: faith that p. It is concerned with the epistemology of such faith: what cognitive attitudes (...) does such faith require, what epistemic norms govern these attitudes, and whether Christian faith can ever adhere to them. (shrink)

There are currently two robust traditions in philosophy dealing with doxastic attitudes: the tradition that is concerned primarily with all-or-nothing belief, and the tradition that is concerned primarily with degree of belief or credence. This paper concerns the relationship between belief and credence for a rational agent, and is directed at those who may have hoped that the notion of belief can either be reduced to credence or eliminated altogether when characterizing the norms governing ideally rational agents. It presents a (...) puzzle which lends support to two theses. First, that there is no formal reduction of a rational agent’s beliefs to her credences, because belief and credence are each responsive to different features of a body of evidence. Second, that if our traditional understanding of our practices of holding each other responsible is correct, then belief has a distinctive role to play, even for ideally rational agents, that cannot be played by credence. The question of which avenues remain for the credence-only theorist is considered. (shrink)

Some early phase clinical studies of candidate HIV cure and remission interventions appear to have adverse medical risk–benefit ratios for participants. Why, then, do people participate? And is it ethically permissible to allow them to participate? Recent work in decision theory sheds light on both of these questions, by casting doubt on the idea that rational individuals prefer choices that maximise expected utility, and therefore by casting doubt on the idea that researchers have an ethical obligation not to enrol participants (...) in studies with high risk–benefit ratios. This work supports the view that researchers should instead defer to the considered preferences of the participants themselves. This essay briefly explains this recent work, and then explores its application to these two questions in more detail. (shrink)

I have claimed that risk-weighted expected utility maximizers are rational, and that their preferences cannot be captured by expected utility theory. Richard Pettigrew and Rachael Briggs have recently challenged these claims. Both authors argue that only EU-maximizers are rational. In addition, Pettigrew argues that the preferences of REU-maximizers can indeed be captured by EU theory, and Briggs argues that REU-maximizers lose a valuable tool for simplifying their decision problems. I hold that their arguments do not succeed and that my original (...) claims still stand. However, their arguments do highlight some costs of REU theory. (shrink)

This paper provides an account of what it is to have faith in a proposition p, in both religious and mundane contexts. It is argued that faith in p doesn’t require adopting a degree of belief that isn’t supported by one’s evidence but rather it requires terminating one’s search for further evidence and acting on the supposition that p. It is then shown, by responding to a formal result due to I.J. Good, that doing so can be rational in a (...) number of circumstances. If expected utility theory is the correct account of practical rationality, then having faith can be both epistemically and practically rational if the costs associated with gathering further evidence or postponing the decision are high. If a more permissive framework is adopted, then having faith can be rational even when there are no costs associated with gathering further evidence. (shrink)

In the peer disagreement debate, three intuitively attractive claims seem to conflict: there is disagreement among peers on many important matters; peer disagreement is a serious challenge to one’s own opinion; and yet one should be able to maintain one’s opinion on important matters. I show that contrary to initial appearances, we can accept all three of these claims. Disagreement significantly shifts the balance of the evidence; but with respect to certain kinds of claims, one should nonetheless retain one’s beliefs. (...) And one should retain them even though these beliefs would not be supported by the new total evidence if one didn’t already hold them. (shrink)

The ‘rollback argument,’ pioneered by Peter van Inwagen, purports to show that indeterminism in any form is incompatible with free will. The argument has two major premises: the first claims that certain facts about chances obtain in a certain kind of hypothetical situation, and the second that these facts entail that some actual act is not free. Since the publication of the rollback argument, the second claim has been vehemently debated, but everyone seems to have taken the first claim for (...) granted. Nevertheless, the first claim is totally unjustified. Even if we accept the second claim, therefore, the argument gives us no reason to think that free will and indeterminism are incompatible. Furthermore, seeing where the rollback argument goes wrong illuminates how a certain kind of incompatibilist, the ‘chance-incompatibilist,’ ought to think about free will and chance, and points to a possibility for free will that has remained largely unexplored. (shrink)

This paper compares two alternative explanations of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge (i.e., the claim that whether an agent knows that p can depend on pragmatic factors). After reviewing the evidence for such pragmatic encroachment, we ask how it is best explained, assuming it obtains. Several authors have recently argued that the best explanation is provided by a particular account of belief, which we call pragmatic credal reductivism. On this view, what it is for an agent to believe a proposition is (...) for her credence in this proposition to be above a certain threshold, a threshold that varies depending on pragmatic factors. We show that while this account of belief can provide an elegant explanation of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge, it is not alone in doing so, for an alternative account of belief, which we call the reasoning disposition account, can do so as well. And the latter account, we argue, is far more plausible than pragmatic credal reductivism, since it accords far better with a number of claims about belief that are very hard to deny. (shrink)

In “Can it be rational to have faith?”, it was argued that to have faith in some proposition consists, roughly speaking, in stopping one’s search for evidence and committing to act on that proposition without further evidence. That paper also outlined when and why stopping the search for evidence and acting is rationally required. Because the framework of that paper was that of formal decision theory, it primarily considered the relationship between faith and degrees of belief, rather than between faith (...) and belief full stop. This paper explores the relationship between rational faith and justified belief, by considering four prominent proposals about the relationship between belief and degrees of belief, and by examining what follows about faith and belief according to each of these proposals. It is argued that we cannot reach consensus concerning the relationship between faith and belief at present because of the more general epistemological lack of consensus over how belief relates to rationality: in particular, over how belief relates to the degrees of belief it is rational to have given one’s evidence. (shrink)

Over the past fifteen years there has been a considerable amount of debate concerning what theoretical population dynamic models tell us about the nature of natural selection and drift. On the causal interpretation, these models describe the causes of population change. On the statistical interpretation, the models of population dynamics models specify statistical parameters that explain, predict, and quantify changes in population structure, without identifying the causes of those changes. Selection and drift are part of a statistical description of population (...) change; they are not discrete, apportionable causes. Our objective here is to provide a definitive statement of the statistical position, so as to allay some confusions in the current literature. We outline four commitments that are central to statisticalism. They are: 1. Natural Selection is a higher order effect; 2. Trait fitness is primitive; 3. Modern Synthesis (MS)-models are substrate neutral; 4. MS-selection and drift are model-relative. (shrink)

Decision theory has at its core a set of mathematical theorems that connect rational preferences to functions with certain structural properties. The components of these theorems, as well as their bearing on questions surrounding rationality, can be interpreted in a variety of ways. Philosophy’s current interest in decision theory represents a convergence of two very different lines of thought, one concerned with the question of how one ought to act, and the other concerned with the question of what action consists (...) in and what it reveals about the actor’s mental states. As a result, the theory has come to have two different uses in philosophy, which we might call the normative use and the interpretive use. It also has a related use that is largely within the domain of psychology, the descriptive use. This essay examines the historical development of decision theory and its uses; the relationship between the norm of decision theory and the notion of rationality; and the interdependence of the uses of decision theory. (shrink)

This essay interprets Butler’s distinction between identity in the loose and popular sense and in the strict and philosophical sense. Suppose there are different standards for counting the same things. Then what are two distinct things counting strictly may be one and the same thing counting loosely. Within a given standard identity is one-one. But across standards it is many-one. An alternative interpretation using the parts-whole relation fails, because that relation should be understood as many-one identity. Another alternative making identity (...) relative to sort fails, because whole and parts can be of the same sort. (shrink)

One phenomenon arising in epistemic life is allegiance to, and break from, a tradition. This phenomenon has three central features. First, individuals who adhere to a tradition seem to respond dogmatically to evidence against their tradition. Second, individuals from different traditions appear to see the same evidence differently. And third, conversion from one tradition to another appears to be different in kind from ordinary belief shift. This paper uses recent work on the nature and rationality of faith to show that (...) these features can all emerge from individuals acting rationally—in particular, from individuals rationally having faith in the core assumptions of their traditions. One upshot is that we don't need to employ the idea of incommensurability to explain these features. (shrink)

Imperatives cannot be true or false, so they are shunned by logicians. And yet imperatives can be combined by logical connectives: "kiss me and hug me" is the conjunction of "kiss me" with "hug me". This example may suggest that declarative and imperative logic are isomorphic: just as the conjunction of two declaratives is true exactly if both conjuncts are true, the conjunction of two imperatives is satisfied exactly if both conjuncts are satisfied—what more is there to say? Much more, (...) I argue. "If you love me, kiss me", a conditional imperative, mixes a declarative antecedent ("you love me") with an imperative consequent ("kiss me"); it is satisfied if you love and kiss me, violated if you love but don't kiss me, and avoided if you don't love me. So we need a logic of three -valued imperatives which mixes declaratives with imperatives. I develop such a logic. (shrink)

Why does classical equilibrium statistical mechanics work? Malament and Zabell (1980) noticed that, for ergodic dynamical systems, the unique absolutely continuous invariant probability measure is the microcanonical. Earman and Rédei (1996) replied that systems of interest are very probably not ergodic, so that absolutely continuous invariant probability measures very distant from the microcanonical exist. In response I define the generalized properties of epsilon-ergodicity and epsilon-continuity, I review computational evidence indicating that systems of interest are epsilon-ergodic, I adapt Malament and Zabell’s (...) defense of absolute continuity to support epsilon-continuity, and I prove that, for epsilon-ergodic systems, every epsilon-continuous invariant probability measure is very close to the microcanonical. (shrink)

A natural view in distributive ethics is that everyone's interests matter, but the interests of the relatively worse off matter more than the interests of the relatively better off. I provide a new argument for this view. The argument takes as its starting point the proposal, due to Harsanyi and Rawls, that facts about distributive ethics are discerned from individual preferences in the "original position." I draw on recent work in decision theory, along with an intuitive principle about risk-taking, to (...) derive the view. (shrink)

You may not know me well enough to evaluate me in terms of my moral character, but I take it you believe I can be evaluated: it sounds strange to say that I am indeterminate, neither good nor bad nor intermediate. Yet I argue that the claim that most people are indeterminate is the conclusion of a sound argument—the indeterminacy paradox—with two premises: (1) most people are fragmented (they would behave deplorably in many and admirably in many other situations); (2) (...) fragmentation entails indeterminacy. I support (1) by examining psychological experiments in which most participants behave deplorably (e.g., by maltreating “prisoners” in a simulated prison) or admirably (e.g., by intervening in a simulated theft). I support (2) by arguing that, according to certain plausible conceptions, character evaluations presuppose behavioral consistency (lack of fragmentation). Possible reactions to the paradox include: (a) denying that the experiments are relevant to character; (b) upholding conceptions according to which character evaluations do not presuppose consistency; (c) granting that most people are indeterminate and explaining why it appears otherwise. I defend (c) against (a) and (b). (shrink)

In several recent contributions to the growing literature on slurs, Hedger draws upon Kaplan's distinction between descriptive and expressive content to argue that slurs are expressions with purely expressive content. The distinction between descriptive and expressive content and the view that slurs are expressions with purely expressive content has been widely acknowledged in prior work, and Hedger aims to contribute to this tradition of scholarship by offering novel arguments in support of his "pure expressivist" account of slurs. But the account (...) that PE offers is explanatorily inadequate, resting on suspect a priori intuitions which also commit one to denying many basic facts about slurs, such as that slurs largely display systematic differential application and that slurs can be used non-offensively between in-group speakers. In this article I provide clear reasons for rejecting PE, arguing particularly against Hedger as one of PE’s most explicit and recent proponents. In showing that PE is inadequate in at least 11 ways, I argue in favor of a mixed or hybrid approach. (shrink)

Twentieth century philosophers introduced the distinction between “objective rightness” and “subjective rightness” to achieve two primary goals. The first goal is to reduce the paradoxical tension between our judgments of (i) what is best for an agent to do in light of the actual circumstances in which she acts and (ii) what is wisest for her to do in light of her mistaken or uncertain beliefs about her circumstances. The second goal is to provide moral guidance to an agent who (...) may be uncertain about the circumstances in which she acts, and hence is unable to use her standard moral principle directly in deciding what to do. This paper distinguishes two important senses of “moral guidance”; proposes criteria of adequacy for accounts of subjective rightness; canvasses existing definitions for “subjective rightness”; finds them all deficient; and proposes a new and more successful account. It argues that each comprehensive moral theory must include multiple principles of subjective rightness to address the epistemic situations of the full range of moral decision-makers, and shows that accounts of subjective rightness formulated in terms of what it would reasonable for the agent to believe cannot provide that guidance. -/- . (shrink)

I argue that an individual has aspects numerically identical with it and each other that nonetheless qualitatively differ from it and each other. This discernibility of identicals does not violate Leibniz's Law, however, which concerns only individuals and is silent about their aspects. They are not in its domain of quantification. To argue that there are aspects I will appeal to the internal conflicts of conscious beings. I do not mean to imply that aspects are confined to such cases, but (...) the best way to start is to recognize them experientially. We can feel the conflicts within ourselves. In doing so we can feel some of our aspects. I will try to enhance our understanding of the concept of aspect by listing and formalizing some principles for its use. After that I will argue that all sorts of individual things have aspects, not just people who are conflicted. (shrink)

Construing the instantiation of a universal by a particular in terms of my theory of aspects resolves the basic mystery of this "non-relational tie", and gives theoretical unity to the four characteristics of instantiation discerned by Armstrong. Taking aspects as distinct in a way akin to Scotus's formal distinction, I suggest that instantiation is the sharing of an aspect by a universal and a particular--a kind of partial identity. This approach allows me to address Plato's multiple location and One over (...) Many problems, Bradley's problem concerning the instantiation of relations, and the problem of change. (shrink)

While there seems to be much evidence that perceptual states can occur without being conscious, some theorists recently express scepticism about unconscious perception. We explore here two kinds of such scepticism: Megan Peters and Hakwan Lau's experimental work regarding the well-known problem of the criterion -- which seems to show that many purported instances of unconscious perception go unreported but are weakly conscious -- and Ian Phillips' theoretical consideration, which he calls the 'problem of attribution' -- the worry that many (...) purported examples of unconscious perception are not perceptual, but rather merely informational and subpersonal. We argue that these concerns do not undermine the evidence for unconscious perception and that this sceptical approach results in a dilemma for the sceptic, who must either deny that there is unconscious mentality generally or explain why perceptual states are unique in the mind such that they cannot occur unconsciously. Both options, we argue, are problematic. (shrink)

"Surrender; therefore, surrender or fight" is apparently an argument corresponding to an inference from an imperative to an imperative. Several philosophers, however (Williams 1963; Wedeking 1970; Harrison 1991; Hansen 2008), have denied that imperative inferences exist, arguing that (1) no such inferences occur in everyday life, (2) imperatives cannot be premises or conclusions of inferences because it makes no sense to say, for example, "since surrender" or "it follows that surrender or fight", and (3) distinct imperatives have conflicting permissive presuppositions (...) ("surrender or fight" permits you to fight without surrendering, but "surrender" does not), so issuing distinct imperatives amounts to changing one's mind and thus cannot be construed as making an inference. In response I argue inter alia that, on a reasonable understanding of 'inference', some everyday-life inferences do have imperatives as premises and conclusions, and that issuing imperatives with conflicting permissive presuppositions does not amount to changing one's mind. (shrink)

Many say that ontological disputes are defective because they are unimportant or without substance. In this paper, we defend ontological disputes from the charge, with a special focus on disputes over the existence of composite objects. Disputes over the existence of composite objects, we argue, have a number of substantive implications across a variety of topics in metaphysics, science, philosophical theology, philosophy of mind, and ethics. Since the disputes over the existence of composite objects have these substantive implications, they are (...) themselves substantive. (shrink)

The good of those who are worse off matters more to the overall good than the good of those who are better off does. But being worse off than one’s fellows is not itself bad; nor is inequality itself bad; nor do differences in well-being matter more when well-being is lower in an absolute sense. Instead, the good of the relatively worse-off weighs more heavily in the overall good than the good of the relatively better-off does, in virtue of the (...) fact that the former are relatively worse off. This paper articulates and defends the view just described. (shrink)

Biological evolution is a complex blend of ever changing structural stability, variability and emergence of new phe- notypes, niches, ecosystems. We wish to argue that the evo- lution of life marks the end of a physics world view of law entailed dynamics. Our considerations depend upon dis- cussing the variability of the very ”contexts of life”: the in- teractions between organisms, biological niches and ecosys- tems. These are ever changing, intrinsically indeterminate and even unprestatable: we do not know ahead of (...) time the ”niches” which constitute the boundary conditions on selec- tion. More generally, by the mathematical unprestatability of the ”phase space”, no laws of mo- tion can be formulated for evolution. We call this radical emergence, from life to life. The purpose of this paper is the integration of variation and diversity in a sound concep- tual frame and situate unpredictability at a novel theoretical level, that of the very phase space. Our argument will be carried on in close comparisons with physics and the mathematical constructions of phase spaces in that discipline. The role of symmetries as invariant preserving transformations will allow us to under- stand the nature of physical phase spaces and to stress the differences required for a sound biological theoretizing. In this frame, we discuss the novel notion of ”enablement”. Life lives in a web of enablement and radical emergence. This will restrict causal analyses to differential cases. Mutations or other causal differ- ences will allow us to stress that ”non conservation princi- ples” are at the core of evolution, in contrast to physical dynamics, largely based on conservation principles as sym- metries. Critical transitions, the main locus of symmetry changes in physics, will be discussed, and lead to ”extended criticality” as a conceptual frame for a better understanding of the living state of matter. (shrink)

There is more than one way to say that composition is identity. Yi has distinguished the Weak Composition thesis from the Strong Composition thesis and attributed the former to David Lewis while noting that Lewis associates something like the latter with me. Weak Composition is the thesis that the relation between the parts collectively and their whole is closely analogous to identity. Strong Composition is the thesis that the relation between the parts collectively and their whole is identity. Yi is (...) right that Strong Composition does not fully reflect my view. We must recognize further what, borrowing Lewis's characterization, could be called the "stronger, and stranger" Composition thesis, or what I'll call the Stronger Composition thesis for short. On Strong Composition, it is only collectively that the parts are identical with the whole. On Stronger Composition, they are individually identical with it as well. I will explain and motivate this thesis. (shrink)

Conceptions of acceptability-based moral or political justification take it that authoritative acceptability constitutes, or contributes to, validity, or justification. There is no agreement as to what bar for authoritativeness such justification may employ. The paper engages the issue in relation to (i) the level of idealization that a bar for authoritativeness, ψ, imparts to a standard of acceptability-based justification, S, and (ii) the degree of discursive purchase of the discursive standing that S accords to people when it builds ψ. I (...) argue that (i) and (ii) are interdependent: high idealization values entail low discursive purchase, while high degrees of purchase require low idealization values. I then distinguish between alethic conceptions of justification that prioritize ends that commit to high idealization values, and recognitive conceptions that favour high discursive purchase. On this basis, I argue for a moderately recognitivist constraint on idealization. To render the recognitive discursive minimum available to relevant people at the site of justification, S should set ψ low enough so that it is a genuine option for actual people to reject relevant views in ways that S recognizes as authoritative. (shrink)

In the Book of Common Prayer’s Rite II version of the Eucharist, the congregation confesses, “we have sinned against you in thought, word, and deed”. According to this confession we wrong God not just by what we do and what we say, but also by what we think. The idea that we can wrong someone not just by what we do, but by what think or what we believe, is a natural one. It is the kind of wrong we feel (...) when those we love believe the worst about us. And it is one of the salient wrongs of racism and sexism. Yet it is puzzling to many philosophers how we could wrong one another by virtue of what we believe about them. This paper defends the idea that we can morally wrong one another by what we believe about them from two such puzzles. The first puzzle concerns whether we have the right sort of control over our beliefs for them to be subject to moral evaluation. And the second concerns whether moral wrongs would come into conflict with the distinctively epistemic standards that govern belief. Our answer to both puzzles is that the distinctively epistemic standards governing belief are not independent of moral considerations. This account of moral encroachment explains how epistemic norms governing belief are sensitive to the moral requirements governing belief. (shrink)

According to Hempel's paradox, evidence (E) that an object is a nonblack nonraven confirms the hypothesis (H) that every raven is black. According to the standard Bayesian solution, E does confirm H but only to a minute degree. This solution relies on the almost never explicitly defended assumption that the probability of H should not be affected by evidence that an object is nonblack. I argue that this assumption is implausible, and I propose a way out for Bayesians. Introduction Hempel's (...) paradox, the standard Bayesian solution, and the disputed assumption Attempts to defend the disputed assumption Attempts to refute the disputed assumption A way out for Bayesians Conclusion. (shrink)

Some photographs show determinate features of a scene because the photographed scene had those features. This dependency relation is, rightly, a consensus in philosophy of photography. I seek to refute many long-established theories of photography by arguing that they are incompatible with this commitment. In Section II, I classify accounts of photography as either single-stage or multi-stage. In Section III, I analyze the historical basis for single-stage accounts. In Section IV, I explain why the single-stage view led scientists to postulate (...) “latent” photographic images as a technical phenomenon in early chemical photography. In Section V, I discredit the notion of an invisible latent image in chemical photography and, in Section VI, extend this objection to the legacy of the latent image in digital photography. In Section VII, I appeal to the dependency relation to explain why the notion of a latent image makes the single-stage account untenable. Finally, I use the multi-stage account to advance debate about “new” versus “orthodox” theories of photography. (shrink)

The orthodox theory of instrumental rationality, expected utility (EU) theory, severely restricts the way in which risk-considerations can figure into a rational individual's preferences. It is argued here that this is because EU theory neglects an important component of instrumental rationality. This paper presents a more general theory of decision-making, risk-weighted expected utility (REU) theory, of which expected utility maximization is a special case. According to REU theory, the weight that each outcome gets in decision-making is not the subjective probability (...) of that outcome; rather, the weight each outcome gets depends on both its subjective probability and its position in the gamble. Furthermore, the individual's utility function, her subjective probability function, and a function that measures her attitude towards risk can be separately derived from her preferences via a Representation Theorem. This theorem illuminates the role that each of these entities plays in preferences, and shows how REU theory explicates the components of instrumental rationality. (shrink)

Many view cancellation as a method for holding influential personalities accountable for bad behavior, while others think cancelling amounts to censorship and bullying. I hold that neither of these accounts are worth pursuing, especially if the aim is social progress. In this paper, I offer a situated account of cancellation and cancel culture, locating the phenomenon in our exclusionary history while examining the social dynamics of belief. When we situate cancel culture, we can see how problematic instances of cancelling are (...) embedded in ignorance. While combatting ignorance appears to call for a remedy rooted in feminist standpoint epistemology, there are risks in adopting naive practices of deference. Applying criticisms of epistemic injustice and adopting Táíwò’s elite capture framework, I explain how well-intentioned cancelling can work against social movements. Since epistemic trust mechanisms discourage self-reflection and belief revision, the relevant tactics for enacting social change—coalition politics and education—seem out of reach. I conclude by sketching cancel culture as a diagnostic tool: cancellation can be used appropriately in marginalized communities, but when it comes to combatting ignorance among privileged folks, we should view cancel culture as a method for determining where our social institutions are failing us. (shrink)

These comments are part of a book symposium on Karen Bennett's book, _Making Things Up_.

Criminal law practices in the US, including policing and incarceration, have drawn heavy criticism for their disproportionate impact on black people, particularly black men. At the same time, some feminist scholars and activists advocate for increases in criminal law responses to sexual assault, including expanding criminal statutes to cover more instances of sexual assault and increasing sentencing guidelines. These reforms are often justified by claims that criminal law should express more feminist values and reject sexist social schemas. This paper makes (...) the case that criminal legal interventions aimed at changing sexist social schemas, such as ‘rape culture,’ are unlikely to be successful because criminal law is effective at maintaining existing social norms, but bad at introducing novel ones. Similarly, in the US, criminality has been ideologically linked to blackness, so attempts to use the stigma of criminality to combat sexual violence are likely to reinforce anti-black racism. The very meaning of a criminal law depends on related social schemas, and the racist social schemas associated with criminality undermine the ability of criminal legal responses to present anti-sexist values. At best, criminal legal reforms aimed at expressing the equal dignity of women will be ambiguous because their meaning is negotiated by existing sexist and racist social schemas. Thus, penal expressivism cannot offer a justification for using criminal law to combat sexual assault. (shrink)